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HAUERWAS, LIBERALISM,  
AND PUBLIC REASON:  
TERMS OF ENGAGEMENT? 
STEPHEN MACEDO* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
As a theologian, Stanley Hauerwas offers a powerful Christian social 
critique of our politics, law, and public culture, emphasizing the perceived 
philosophical shortcomings of liberalism. Although I am neither a Christian 
theologian nor a student of Christian theology, I recognize that Hauerwas is an 
important, often penetrating, social critic. Nevertheless, his philosophical 
account of the alleged shortcomings of liberalism frequently misfires. 
Many of Hauerwas’s substantive moral concerns seem to me quite salutary: 
he opposes our increasingly warlike foreign policy; he calls attention to the 
plight of African Americans, the poor, the disabled, and the marginalized and 
excluded generally, seeking to mobilize people to work on their behalf. He 
expresses concern with sexual permissiveness, abortion, and the decline of 
lifelong marital commitment. He seems to me obviously correct in his effort to 
remind Christians that the example of Jesus and his cross should challenge us to 
question the rampant materialism, consumerism, and self-concern that 
characterize our popular culture. While I disagree with some of his specifics—
his strict pacifism for example—these substantive criticisms all seem to me 
constructive contributions to public moral discussion. 
However, Hauerwas’s concerns with the reigning public moral culture are 
frequently aligned under a general philosophical characterization of 
liberalism—and liberal law and politics—that seems to me caricatured and 
unhelpful. The very fact that he uses the shorthand of “liberalism” to describe 
the dominant culture is decidedly misleading for a number of reasons. To begin 
with, many historical and cultural forces besides liberalism have influenced 
American politics and culture.1 Moreover, the term “liberalism” can be used to 
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 1.  The view associated with Louis Hartz’ 1955 work The Liberal Tradition in America that 
America has been shaped by no political traditions other than liberalism has been widely discredited. 
See generally BARRY ALAN SHAIN, THE MYTH OF AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM: THE PROTESTANT 
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1994); ROGERS SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING 
VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (1997).  
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cover a range of different and even opposed political positions. Our politics is 
increasingly libertarian and conservative—or, “classical liberal” if you will—and 
it drifts ever further from the concern with social justice that has been the 
hallmark of egalitarian liberalism for decades. Hauerwas ascribes to liberalism a 
variety of abstract philosophical commitments that have little, or nothing to do 
with the theory and practice of liberal constitutionalism and politics.2 
With respect to his substantive moral concerns, Hauerwas writes mainly as 
an anti-accommodationist Christian—that is, in opposition to Christians 
accommodating themselves to the dominant culture. He complains that people 
have misunderstood him as a “theological and political reactionary.”3 While he 
obviously is not that, the confusion is understandable, and his jaundiced view of 
liberalism may well aid the forces of political reaction, as Jeffrey Stout has also 
suggested.4 To adequately assess liberalism, and to constructively address the 
social and political problems that trouble Hauerwas, we need a livelier 
appreciation than Hauerwas offers of the practical contributions of liberal 
justice, rights, and constitutional institutions. 
As I have said, I am neither a theologian nor a Hauerwas scholar. He writes 
primarily as a theologian speaking to his fellow Christians about Christianity. I 
am a political theorist who sympathizes strongly with the liberal political 
tradition, properly understood. We are both concerned with our shared political 
project and its justifiability, so that will be my focus here. 
II 
THE LIBERAL CORE AND IDEAL 
“Liberalism” is a capacious term: the liberal tradition is complex and multi-
stranded, or as Hauerwas himself has described it, “a many-faced and 
historically ambiguous phenomenon.”5 There are various reasonable ways of 
characterizing it. I understand liberalism’s moral core to be the emphasis on the 
political importance of equal basic individual rights. Persons are understood, in 
their political capacity, as free and equal, and an urgent political imperative is to 
secure citizens in their basic interests understood in the language of rights and 
justice. Basic liberal rights include various personal and political freedoms, 
including the free exercise of religion, as well as positive entitlements—where 
 
 2.  These are all familiar themes from liberalism’s communitarian critics, including Alasdair 
MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel and others. Hauerwas is also evidently influenced by radical 
democratic critics of liberalism, such as Sheldon Wolin, as well as other critics, including William 
Connolly. Hauerwas may have arrived at his views independently, but he generously cites all of these 
thinkers in his works.  I have argued that liberalism has ample resources to respond to communitarian 
and civic republican concerns. See generally STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, 
VIRTUE AND COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990).  
 3.  STANLEY HAUERWAS, HANNAH’S CHILD 208 (2010). 
 4.  Jeffrey Stout, The Spirit of Democracy and the Rhetoric of Excess, 35 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 3, 
21 (2007). 
 5.  STANLEY HAUERWAS, A COMMUNITY OF CHARACTER 77 (1981); see also ALASDAIR 
MACINTYRE, AGAINST THE SELF-IMAGES OF THE AGE 281 (1971).  
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resources permit—to security, subsistence, due process of law, and, in general, 
effective and popularly accountable government that secures basic common 
interests.6 These protections must be secured institutionally, via the rule of law 
and politically independent courts,7 constitutional design, regular opportunities 
to hold public officials accountable, and a generally supportive public or civic 
culture. Basic rights and liberties are not secure unless rights-consciousness and 
civic values shape the major institutions and associations of society, including 
those of civil society—the family, churches, for example—to some degree. The 
liberal agenda so understood has been influential: the demand that legitimate 
governments must secure citizens in a range of basic rights and that the people 
must be able to hold their governments accountable has become a global 
political morality.8 That seems to me an enormous moral advance, though also a 
work in progress. 
This core of basic normative claims is enhanced by those strains of our 
political traditions and political philosophy that emphasize that all political 
power should be accompanied by public reasons.9 This expectation is 
continuous with the rule of law’s opposition to arbitrary power. In religiously 
diverse political communities, these traditions would oppose the claim that 
those who wield political power are accountable only to God or only to the 
community of true believers. Public reasons are those whose force does not 
depend upon embracing a particular view of what is true on religious, 
philosophical, and other matters about which reasonable people disagree; we 
have to work out the contours of our public morality in political practice 
(pragmatically, if you wish). In conditions of diversity, public reasons furnish a 
common court of appeal: standards that are accessible to all reasonable 
members of the political community. It is best to try and work out our public 
morality (or public philosophy, or constitutional framework) as a freestanding 
and independent system of principled claims. There is no guarantee that 
 
 6.  For a nice account, see HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. 
FOREIGN POLICY (2d. ed. 1980), especially chapters 1–3.  
 7.  Terms such as “politically independent” can provoke confusion: what I mean is that courts 
often have some insulation from day-to-day partisan politics as practiced by elected legislatures. 
However, the decision to create courts and give them power is a political decision, and the power they 
wield and the decisions they make are political, though hopefully also principled. The virtue of courts 
when they work reasonably well is the way they exercise power, not that in some deep sense they 
transcend politics. In some of his writings, Hauerwas seems to think that liberalism rests on a deeper 
and more problematic distinction between law and politics than is in fact the case (as if it’s committed 
to a pre-legal-realism understanding of law).  
 8.  See CHARLES R. BEITZ, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (2009). For a sign of the progressive 
development of these ideas, see The Responsibility to Protect (R2P): A Primer, INT’L CRISIS GRP.,   
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/key-issues/thematic/responsibility-to-protect.aspx/ (last 
visited Sept. 22, 2012). 
 9.  I would identify this tradition most recently with Rawls and Habermas, but all they have done 
is give philosophical expression to ideas that have long been part of democratic and constitutional 
traditions. Judges have long deployed a standard of the “reasonable person” to indicate that a judge’s 
reasoning must be widely publicly accessible if it is to be legitimate. See, e.g., BENJAMIN CARDOZO, 
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 89 (1921). For political debate and practice, see generally 
E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE (1975). 
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justified principles of political morality will be equal in their effects on, or equal 
in their appeal to, each of the particular religious and philosophical worldviews 
that citizens espouse. 
Public reason is a democratic ideal that should be especially attractive in 
conditions of diversity. With respect to religion, that means denominational 
pluralism rather than either sectarianism or secularism, which is one of the 
reasons the idea has long had appeal in the United States.10 From early on, 
many Americans have recognized the value of a distinctive set of public 
purposes, institutions, and reasons affirmed as “common” in the face of the 
divisions and differences among the great variety of Christian communities and 
other religious traditions.11 The American constitution itself represents and 
promotes this aspiration to civic commonality in the face of great diversity. 
I have mentioned the importance to liberalism of individual rights and other 
constitutional guarantees as secured by society’s fundamental law—its 
constitution. Some scholarly critics say that liberalism’s alliance with 
constitutionalism and rights shows that it denies or displaces politics and 
difference.12 But constitutions and specific constitutional guarantees (including 
rights) are the product of political struggle. Their interpretation, enforcement, 
and possible amendment animate much of our politics. It is good, for example, 
that the First Amendment’s speech clause is generally understood to include the 
right to criticize the government, and that gays are now recognized as having a 
right to engage in intimate sexual relations without the threat of criminal 
prosecution. Rights enable and protect diversity and differences, at least within 
the limits of our civil equality. Moreover, the contours of our rights are subject 
to constant contestation and reinterpretation. The core of some rights may be 
largely secure in some places insofar as they are backed by institutional support 
and a broad social consensus—in all areas of life, some issues get more or less 
settled—but that only means that controversies have shifted elsewhere. 
Law is just a way of organizing some of our politics: the decision to accord 
some power to judges, for example, is a political decision (and one that has 
been debated incessantly in American history). The idea that devices such as 
law, rights, and constitutionalism displace politics is based on a simplistic 
account of the relationship between activity and constraints in the realm of law 
and politics. Just as commitments can be enabling in personal life (a point that 
 
 10.  I understand that, from some points of view, today’s religious pluralism in America looks like 
the predominance of secularist values. Insofar as religious Americans embrace the core values of liberal 
democracy, their choices and preferences seem to me reasonable and humane. Insofar as the concern 
with “secularism” pertains to excessive materialism, consumerism, self-centeredness, I share the 
concern; but those aren’t liberal values.  
 11.  I have written about this in the context of the common school movement, which began in the 
late 1820s and which developed into the system of American public schooling. See generally STEPHEN 
MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION IN A MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY 
(2000).  
 12.  See, e.g., BONNIE HONIG, POLITICAL THEORY AND THE DISPLACEMENT OF POLITICS (1993); 
WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, THE ETHOS OF PLURALIZATION (1995); JAMES TULLY, STRANGE 
MULTIPLICITY: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE AGE OF DIVERSITY (1995).  
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Professor Hauerwas makes eloquently) so they are in political life, as well.13 
Liberalism counts on shaping, to some degree, people’s extra-political 
associations and communities, including families and religious communities. 
Feminists have made this point very powerfully. The larger point is also a 
truism in discussions of democratization. If it is insisted, for example, that 
Shariah is the only source of law, and that claim is interpreted to mean that 
religious authorities should be empowered to overturn laws and select 
candidates for office, liberal democracy does not have much chance. 
However, it is equally true that liberal rights protect the freedom of 
associations and particular communities to resist full compliance with liberal 
and democratic values. The Catholic Church is free to refuse to ordain women, 
or to marry gays, and it can decide who is and who is not a Catholic in good 
standing, eligible to receive the sacraments. Hard questions are bound to arise 
at the boundary between religious free-exercise claims and state efforts to 
advance important public purposes, including protections against arbitrary 
forms of discrimination. A unanimous Supreme Court has recently held that 
federal anti-discrimination laws do not apply to church employees who perform 
religious duties.14 Should public funds flow to faith-based adoption agencies that 
refuse categorically to place children with gay and lesbian couples? 
Liberals disagree about the resolution of such hard cases, and there are 
often no easy formulas for settling them. Competing substantive values need to 
be weighed, and the crucial issues often concern contested empirical questions: 
Is there, for example, credible evidence that gay marriage hurts families and 
children? How many young Muslim women in France who wear hijab are 
forced to do so against their will? Political communities’ constitutional 
traditions are histories of such debates as they work through the political 
process and are debated in the legislatures and courts, in newspapers and other 
media, in churches and union halls, and even in scholarly journals of religion, 
law, and philosophy. Some liberals will place great emphasis on respecting the 
autonomy and integrity of churches and faith-based organizations; others will 
place greater emphasis on combatting discrimination in all associations. 
With respect to all of these matters, there is also a fair degree of reasonable 
variation among different political communities’ constitutional and political 
traditions. Particular formulations of basic rights and guarantees develop 
around a political community’s constitution, written or otherwise. But these 
formulations also coalesce around the tradition of a given constitution’s 
interpretation and application, as well as the commitments and understandings 
that effectively govern particular communities with unique histories. It is 
extremely important that political processes provide for the weighing of 
 
 13.  There are many excellent discussions of this theme. See generally CHRISTOPHER L. 
EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001); STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND 
CONSTRAINTS: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (1995); LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE 
IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE (2004). 
 14.  See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S.Ct. 694 (2012). 
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complaints from adherents to particular religious or ethical ideals when they 
believe that their commitments or practices are being unnecessarily or unfairly 
burdened. Any decent ideal of public reasoning must include appropriate 
venues for listening to and fairly weighing minority religious or ethical 
complaints that are grounded in people’s deepest non-public religious and 
ethical commitments. In the United States, this has been a primary concern of 
the courts. This difficult task requires delicate judgments and practical wisdom 
concerning how to balance public purposes—including the health, welfare, and 
education of children as future citizens—with parental and religious concerns. 
American judges and political institutions have often erred, but the 
commitment to extending special attention to laws that burden the free exercise 
of religion or discriminate against religious minorities is central to liberal 
democratic constitutionalism. 
Although public reasons and evidence ought ultimately to be authoritative 
in a liberal democracy when deciding our most important political questions, 
liberal democratic communities also can benefit enormously from the moral 
energies and insights of particular religious communities and traditions. When 
making law or formulating public policies for a religiously diverse community it 
is not enough to say things like “when Christ disarmed Peter he disarmed all 
soldiers for all time.”15 Religious claims of this sort may of course provoke 
discussions that contribute to public deliberation in important ways. I hope and 
believe that justice can be discerned and defended on the basis of publicly 
accessible reasons and evidence, but unjust and murderous policies should be 
fought with all of the resources at our disposal. While everyone should be free 
to offer whatever reasons they think fit, and while religious reasons and 
arguments do often contribute to public deliberation, it remains a basic 
principle of political morality that those advocating for laws touching on 
important matters that affect all communities ought to assure themselves that 
those laws are justified to all on whom they are imposed. 
Critics of liberalism often exaggerate the conflicts among religious and 
liberal values. In fact, a norm of public reason tends to govern our national 
politics, and as scholars such as Jon A. Shields have shown, that norm is 
typically espoused even by religious activists on the Christian right.16 
The recent book by Robert D. Putnam and David E. Campbell, American 
Grace,17 makes it clear that religious communities contribute to the health of 
American civic life in a wide variety of ways. Religious Americans are more 
civically active and trusting of others, and more apt to give their time and 
money to charities, including secular charities; they express more altruistic 
values and are “better neighbors,” according to Putnam and Campbell.18 
 
 15.  HAUERWAS, supra note 3, at 273. 
 16.  JON A. SHIELDS, THE DEMOCRATIC VIRTUES OF THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT (2009).  
 17.  ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID E. CAMPBELL, AMERICAN GRACE (2010). 
 18.  Id. at 464, 471. Putnam and Campbell furnish evidence suggesting that the increased civic 
activity is not the result of increased religiosity in the sense of belief or intensity of belief; rather, what 
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Putnam and Campbell paint a generally (though not uniformly) positive picture 
of the contributions of religious communities to the health of American 
democracy and civic life. It would be natural to conclude on the basis of this 
evidence that there is a considerable overlap between Christian virtue and the 
virtues of American constitutional (or liberal) democracy. However, the various 
civic contributions that Putnam and Campbell describe do not include some of 
Hauerwas’s most distinctive concerns about American popular culture. 
Hauerwas might say that religion’s various contributions to “good citizenship” 
do not represent or reflect distinctively Christian virtues, at least as Hauerwas 
understands them. 
Liberalism, like Christianity, stands for the equal dignity of all persons. The 
leading liberal political theorists—the very ones that Hauerwas criticizes, such 
as Rawls—are principally concerned with reminding the rich what they owe to 
the poor. This seems to me to resonate rather powerfully with Jesus’ mission on 
earth, reaching out constantly to the less well-off, as he did, and admonishing 
others do so. “But when you give a banquet, invite the poor, the crippled, the 
lame, the blind, and you will be blessed.”19 
Liberal commitments give rise to what seem to me attractive civic virtues, 
and ideals of democratic politics that are worth aspiring to. As Hauerwas 
acknowledges, it makes sense to speak of “liberal virtues” and, I would add, a 
liberal political community with distinctive traditions, practices, stories, 
memories, and sense of history. Any adequate account of the civic virtues of 
liberal democratic citizens would be quite capacious, and would have to include 
such virtues as tolerance of reasonable forms of diversity, but also the 
willingness to act in the face of injustice, sympathy with the less well-off, a 
capacity to appreciate the point of view of others, and a willingness to support 
fair terms of social cooperation. A subset of liberal democratic virtues includes 
qualities associated with civil deliberation: politics should involve reason giving 
and reason demanding, and we should seek to promote sounder understandings 
of what justice requires. One can be a good citizen—courageous and effective in 
opposing injustice in concert with others—without fully appreciating the virtues 
of civil deliberation. (I return to these matters in the conclusion.) 
It is widely recognized that the liberal tradition has its internal divisions, 
perhaps the greatest one being the divergence of what is referred to as 
“classical” versus more egalitarian approaches. Classical liberal scholars, such as 
Friederich A. Hayek and Milton Friedman, allowed for a social safety net, but 
opposed institutional mechanisms designed to promote social justice and fair 
equality of opportunity (Hayek famously thought the very idea of “social 
 
matters are religious social networks, including having friends from church. Id. at 471–9.  Deeply 
observant religious people are more generous with their own time and money than their less religious 
fellows, but they are less supportive of government policies to address the structural causes of poverty. 
Id. at 256. Religious Americans are less tolerant of dissent, and Americans’ warmth toward people of 
other faiths chills with respect to Mormons and especially Muslims. Id. at 509.   
 19.  Luke 14:13. 
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justice” was an oxymoron).20 The more egalitarian and democratic versions of 
liberalism predominate in today’s academy, but classically liberal political 
initiatives and ideas have enjoyed a remarkable resurgence in our politics since 
the rise of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, and indeed the “Tea Party.” 
Egalitarian liberalism as a body of political theory—represented by John Rawls 
and Ronald Dworkin and others, which tends to be referred to generically as 
“liberalism”—gives philosophical expression to some of the commitments that 
profoundly reshaped American politics and culture from the New Deal, to the 
“Great Society” programs of the 1960s, and into the 1970s, with the 
development of the welfare state; greater equality for blacks, women, and other 
minorities (eventually including gays and lesbians); enhanced criminal due 
process; fairer political representation; and greater personal freedom.21 
In the era after Thatcher and Reagan, egalitarian liberal ideas have had 
diminishing influence in politics. Liberals are typically appalled by the vast and 
growing inequalities of wealth, income, and opportunity in many Western 
countries, including the United States. They also are dismayed at the profound 
influence of money in politics and the increased marginalization of the poor. 
The influence of liberal political principles of fairness and equal citizenship are 
greater in the academy and educated circles generally, which has led to serious 
efforts on the part of conservatives to promote their own version of “affirmative 
action” for free-market and conservative ideas and academics. So it seems to 
me that academic reflection concerning liberal justice and democracy has 
improved enormously in the last hundred years, but, over the last thirty years in 
particular, our practice has in many respects declined. 
What I have offered here is a brief and selective reading of history, leaving 
out much that has been espoused by people who thought of themselves as 
“liberals” and who were so identified in public. Some “liberals” supported the 
Vietnam war, especially early on, and no doubt many “liberals” have made a 
variety of other terrible mistakes. Politics is a sprawling messy business and 
there is a lot of room to do great damage. Hauerwas’s first published piece, An 
Ethical Appraisal of Black Power, “suggested that the negative reaction of 
white liberals to black power not only exposed shallow and platitudinous 
sentiments such as ‘all men are created equal,’ but also robbed white liberals of 
their attempt to relieve the guilt of being white by identifying with the civil 
rights struggle.”22 I admire Hauerwas’s social radicalism and moral courage, and 
most of all his eagerness to side with the underdog. However, just as he seeks to 
understand Christianity at its best, I would say that we owe the same treatment 
to liberalism. Both, after all, are complex traditions of thought and practice 
informed by high moral aspirations and terrible actual failures. 
As Jaroslav Pelikan has argued, the difference between a people’s history 
 
 20.  See generally FRIEDERICH A. HAYEK, 2 LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY (1976).  
 21.  The story is obviously much more complicated than that, and includes earlier (and later) 
progressive reforms.  
 22.  HAUERWAS, supra note 3, at 79. 
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and its traditions is that the latter includes an element of critical moral 
judgment.23 History is the morally checkered record of everything we have 
done: some good, some bad. Our tradition, on the other hand, is that part of our 
record that we endorse and wish to carry forward into the future: those of our 
practices that we honor and wish to live up to, not forgetting our failures, but 
keeping them in mind so as to try to avoid them in the future. So, while 
Hauerwas describes liberalism as unrooted in history and tradition (he writes of 
“the liberal attempt to form a politics and ethics without memory”24) we can 
speak of the liberal tradition in America just as easily as we can of Christian 
traditions. 
III 
HAUERWAS, CHRISTIANITY, AND LIBERALISM 
Hauerwas sometimes seems to oppose liberalism root and branch. He takes 
his bearings with respect to liberalism from its critics rather than its defenders, 
with the result that Hauerwas often portrays liberalism at its worst, rather than 
its best.25 It is hazardous and unfair to interpret a tradition of thought based 
mainly on the claims of its harshest critics, as if taking one’s bearings on 
Christianity from the late Christopher Hitchens. Yet that is often how 
Hauerwas treats liberalism. Nevertheless, let us consider here some of the main 
themes that run through Hauerwas’s positive teachings. 
Hauerwas’s central aim seems to be to remind Christians of the 
distinctiveness and demanding nature of their vocation and way of life, calling 
upon them to follow Jesus and “be the Church,” the “peaceable kingdom.” 
Contemporary Christians fail to comprehend distinctively Christian teachings 
and virtues: they are too much in and of the public world and its culture. The 
theological expression of this form of engaging with the world by assimilating 
with it is Protestant liberalism. Hauerwas argues that Christians should instead 
focus their attention on living within the church as Christians: worshipping 
together as a community, practicing distinctive Christian virtues, and witnessing 
to the truths revealed by Jesus’ cross and resurrection.26 To be a Christian in the 
modern world, Hauerwas contends, requires a profound “transformation of the 
self,” and “fidelity to the cross of Christ”; the Christian moral life “is not an 
achievement easily accomplished by the many, but a demanding task that only a 
 
 23.  See JAROLSAV PELIKAN, THE VINDICATION OF TRADITION 43–64 (1984).  
 24.  STANLEY HAUERWAS, PERFORMING THE FAITH: BONHOEFFER AND THE PRACTICE OF 
NONVIOLENCE 224 (2004). 
 25.  I greatly admire Sheldon Wolin, for example, and Politics and Vision, but his view of liberalism 
there is deeply one-sided, and he is an unreliable guide to Rawls. I share Jeff Stout’s reservations about 
“fugitive democracy,” as expressed in The Spirit of Democracy and the Rhetoric of Excess. See Stout, 
supra note 4, at 16–19. Hauerwas describes being influenced by MacIntyre as well as Wolin, among 
other critics of liberalism.  See supra note 24, at 223–233.  
 26.  See generally STANLEY HAUERWAS, On Keeping Theological Ethics Theological, in STANLEY 
HAUERWAS, THE HAUERWAS READER 51, 51–74 (John Berkman & Michael Cartwright eds., 2001). 
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few master.”27 Much of Hauerwas’s academic work contends that appreciation 
of Christianity as a body of moral and practical knowledge of how we should 
live will only follow actually living the Christian life in church communities: 
following the way of Jesus and witnessing to Christian beliefs in one’s life, in the 
faith that such a life is “with the grain of the universe.”28 His criticisms of 
Christian ethics and his reliance on MacIntyre emphasize the rootedness of 
moral (and spiritual) knowledge in particular practices and traditions, as well as 
the narratives, stories, and roles that constitute and animate those traditions. 
These can only be grasped from the inside and appreciated by those who live 
those lives. 
Hauerwas says that modern life is—in a variety of ways that he often lumps 
under the rubric “liberalism”—hostile to the sort of life marked out for us by 
Jesus. The values and way of life of “bourgeois liberalism” have colonized and 
debased the Christian consciousness.29 American Christians have come to want 
to be good citizens: to serve in the military, hold public office, and raise their 
children to be “successful” as this is defined by our popular culture (that is, 
prosperous, with a good career, individually fulfilled). In many ways this 
represents the success of our civic culture: religious life has been fundamentally 
reshaped by basic liberal and democratic values. But “civic aims” such as 
justice, rights, the public good, economic security, national defense via 
organized violence, social programs to help the poor, and the improvement of 
American democracy, even at their best, Hauerwas seems to say, threaten to 
distract Christians from their central mission. At their worst, as in the case of 
violence and imperialism, these aims diametrically oppose Christian virtues, 
Hauerwas contends. In our badly fallen world, the desire to be a “good citizen” 
often implicates Christians in heinous collective enterprises. 
In light of these challenges, Hauerwas calls upon Christians to live as 
Christians and be constant witnesses to Jesus. They should take their ethical 
and practical bearings from the ways of Jesus, as realized (or approximated) in 
the most authentic and faithful Christian churches, not those of the marketplace 
or the public square. In Hauerwas’s view, no particular denomination has a lock 
on the truth since his personal search—eloquently recounted—has taken him to 
faith communities with a variety of denominational affiliations.30 
If I read Hauerwas correctly, what are we (that is, those who believe in core 
liberal democratic values and virtues, roughly as I do, believers or not) to make 
of all this? 
 
 27.  Id. at 70; see also STANLEY HAUERWAS, Jesus and the Social Embodiment of the Peaceable 
Kingdom, in THE HAUERWAS READER, supra note 26, at 116. 
 28.  See STANLEY HAUERWAS, WITH THE GRAIN OF THE UNIVERSE 16–17, 231 (2001).  
 29.  STANLEY HAUERWAS, Christianity: It’s Not a Religion, It’s an Adventure, in THE HAUERWAS 
READER supra note 26, at 522, 528. 
 30.  I have great admiration for the sorts of church communities Hauerwas describes favorably in 
Hannah’s Child.  See HAUERWAS, supra note 3, at 254. 
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A.   The Liberal Core and Popular Culture 
As an observer of American popular life and politics, there is much truth in 
many of Hauerwas’s complaints. He seems to me an extremely interesting, 
provocative, and frequently quite penetrating social critic. He has a keen eye 
for our hypocrisies, self-serving myths, and prejudices. He is right that our 
public culture is often profoundly and depressingly materialistic, self-centered, 
individualistic, and enormously self-congratulatory; our foreign policy is far too 
ready to resort to violence. Christians ought to challenge our dominant 
materialist popular culture far more than they do, via alternative narratives and 
radical criticisms that attend to the example of Jesus. But, as Hauerwas points 
out, religious communities often seem only to rationalize and sanctify the 
crassest, most self-serving, and least reflective aspects of our culture (the 
widespread popularity of the prosperity gospel of such figures as Joel Osteen, 
for example). Hauerwas’s challenges to modern bourgeois prejudices are often 
to the point. 
Hauerwas’s mode of writing is not that of political analysis or institutional 
design, and I do not see an alternative political program in those of his writings 
that I have looked at. His view of Christian ethics seems to involve doing the 
right thing (as he understands it) and letting the consequences take care of 
themselves. So, his commitment to pacifism is not defended as part of a political 
program or plan in the usual sense: we should renounce war in the belief that 
Jesus did and with faith that, well, our fate is in God’s hands . . . ? I’m not sure.31 
In some passages, including in his advocacy of pacifism, apparently even in the 
face of the Nazi threat, he strikes me as astonishingly utopian, almost apolitical. 
I also readily concede, however, that Americans, including American 
Christians, err badly on the side of uncritical patriotism. We would, in fact, be 
far better off if more Christians refused to serve in the armed forces as currently 
constituted and deployed, and likewise insisted on adherence to the rules and 
principles of just war theory as understood in much of the Christian tradition.32 I 
applaud Hauerwas’s interventions in the wake of the September 11 attacks. He 
offers a sort of alternative Christian political vision and an invitation to try it 
out. He does not, so far as I can see, offer anything like a practical political 
theory, or an argument for his politics addressed to a diverse audience. 
It sometimes seems as though politics are peripheral to Hauerwas’s central 
theological and religious concerns, and liberalism winds up being so much 
collateral damage. Many of his central criticisms of the popular culture would 
be joined by many liberals. I am perfectly prepared to join some (or many) of 
Hauerwas’s complaints about American public life. The values that increasingly 
 
 31.  Jeffrey Stout, who is far more familiar with Hauerwas’s voluminous writings than I, calls for 
greater clarity from Hauerwas with respect to his positive program. See Stout, supra note 4, at 18. 
 32.  See generally STANLEY HAUERWAS, Should War be Eliminated?A Thought Experiment, in 
THE HAUERWAS READER, supra note 26, at 392, 392–425; see also STANLEY HAUERWAS, Why Gays 
(as a Group) are Morally Superior to Christians (as a Group), in THE HAUERWAS READER, supra note 
26, at 519–21.  
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shape popular culture, for example, are those of the marketplace and 
consumerism. But these are not the core values of liberalism and democracy, or 
at least there is no reason why an academic should smush all of these things 
together. Hauerwas sometimes writes as though the core of “liberalism” is 
classical liberalism—Adam Smith and John Locke—and even then he 
exaggerates or oversimplifies their commitments to commercial values. When 
Hauerwas says that “to conserve economic liberalism is antithetical to the 
formation of communities capable of caring for one another in the name of the 
common good,”33 he sounds a lot to me like a democratic egalitarian liberal like 
Rawls or Dworkin. In contrast, he also places little emphasis on important 
features of modern life that are absolutely central to liberal politics. He never 
adequately grapples with the political problem of profound religious diversity, 
and he is far more preoccupied by secularism. 
B.   Hauerwas and Economic Liberalism 
Hauerwas’s main objects of attack often seem not to be the liberal core as I 
have described it—fundamental human equality and rights, constitutional 
institutions, democracy, and the welfare state—but rather, “economic 
liberalism,” meaning capitalism and bourgeois popular culture, including the 
sexual permissiveness that came out of the 1960s. “[U]nder the influence of 
Macpherson I have always assumed my criticisms of liberalism were criticisms 
of the dominance of capitalist modes of life.”34 I’m prepared to credit much of 
Hauerwas’s reading of “bourgeois liberalism.” But this calls for a little 
discrimination. 
I wonder what Hauerwas makes of the fact that Rawls says that a capitalist 
society, which he refers to as a capitalist welfare state, assuming its best form, 
cannot be a just society.35 The fundamental problems Rawls ascribes to a 
capitalist welfare state can be thought of as problems of culture and virtue. It 
allows people to heap up and accumulate very unequal amounts of private 
property, and then hopes that, at the end of the day, they will be willing to 
redistribute it to the poor so that shares are fair. This is quite unrealistic, says 
Rawls: it relies too heavily on the supposition that the greatly advantaged will 
be stably committed to ongoing redistribution. What we need is to prevent 
wealth and political power from accumulating in the first instance by steep 
inheritance taxes and an insistence on fair equality of opportunity across 
generations. That is, everyone must be furnished with the education and 
resources needed to compete for the best jobs and positions of leadership. 
Another important way in which Rawls distances himself from capitalism is 
in denying that there is any necessary value in continued economic growth: once 
 
 33.  HAUERWAS, supra note 3, at 269. 
 34.  HAUERWAS, supra note 24, at 228.  
 35.  See JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT  136–140 (2001)  (discussing two 
options concerning property and social provision that are consistent with liberal justice, namely, 
democratic socialism and “property owning democracy”).  
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we have enough stuff for the good life, a “steady state” economy is fine.36 Rawls 
is in no way a celebrator of “commercial society” or “economic liberalism.” 
Now, this may not be radical enough for Hauerwas, and Hauerwas may be 
right. But we get nowhere in that discussion by caricaturing the original position 
or ignoring the profound differences between classical and contemporary 
liberals. 
Even when it comes to the defenders of commercial society, or capitalism, 
Hauerwas is sometimes unfair. His brief discussion of Adam Smith and his 
influence in The Radical Hope37 is in some ways interesting and insightful, but 
extremely one-sided. He has a sharp eye for all that is wrong with bourgeois 
commercialism, but misses what was, for Smith, the essential saving grace. 
Smith himself found many aspects of commercial society extremely 
unattractive. This includes the absolute pivot of economic development—the 
division of labor—which Smith describes as dehumanizing in its effects.38 He 
knew that capitalists were constantly scheming to advantage themselves at the 
expense of labor, while labor was the source of all value.39 And he was deeply 
influenced by Rousseau’s criticisms of private property. One can play with 
undergraduates a game that consists of reading aloud passages from Smith. 
Often they guess that the author is Karl Marx, rather than the intellectual father 
of capitalism. So the question is why, in spite of the many unlovely aspects of 
commercialism, Smith still thought economic markets were a boon to human 
welfare and a great moral improvement. 
The answer is the lives it makes possible for the poor masses: lives freed of 
utter poverty and misery. Smith had a Malthusian view. He believed the 
birthrate would tend to outpace production, thus lowering wages to bare 
subsistence or worse. Only a constantly growing economy, made possible by 
progressive economic development, would raise the wages of workers above the 
barest subsistence. Smith’s most moving passages describe the contrast between 
ordinary people’s lives in growing economies versus economically “stationary,” 
or even declining, societies. “It is not uncommon, I have been told, in the 
Highlands of Scotland for a mother who has borne twenty children not to have 
two alive . . . . In some places one half the children die before they are four 
years of age . . . .”40 China was for him the great example of a “long stationary” 
 
 36.  See JOHN RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES 107–08 (1999) (drawing on Mill).  
 37.  STANLEY HAUERWAS, The Radical Hope in the Annunciation: Why Both Single and Married 
Christians Welcome Children, in THE HAUERWAS READER, supra note 26, at 508–11. 
 38.  Of the workers under a highly developed division of labor Smith says, they “generally 
become[] as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become . . . . It corrupts even 
the activity of his body.” ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS 327 (Thomas Nelson ed., 1843).   
 39.  “Masters are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform combination, 
not to raise the wages of labour . . . .” Id. at 28. “People of the same trade seldom meet together, even 
for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some 
contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law which either 
could be executed, or would be consistent with liberty and justice.” Id. at 54. 
 40.  Id. at 33.  
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economy, the consequence of which was masses of people living in abject 
poverty. Of Canton, he wrote: 
The subsistence which they find there is so scanty that they are eager to fish up the 
nastiest garbage thrown overboard from any European ship. Any carrion, the carcasse 
of a dead dog or cat, for example, though half putrid and stinking, is as welcome to 
them as the most wholesome food to the people of other countries. Marriage is 
encouraged in China, not by the profitableness of children, but by the liberty of 
destroying them. In all the great towns several are every night exposed in the street, or 
drowned like puppies in the water. The performance of this horrid office is even said 
to be the avowed business by which some people earn their subsistence.
41
 
So the moral rationale for commercialism was “this improvement in the 
circumstances of the lower ranks of the people,”42 and on Smith’s reckoning this 
was worth the price that had to be paid in terms of commercialism’s offensive 
and unlovely aspects. Any commentary on Smith and bourgeois commercialism 
should recognize this underlying deeply humanitarian calculus, which 
subsequent historians have confirmed.43 The humanitarianism that lies behind 
Smith’s program, which seems to me quite Christian in spirit, should not be 
ignored. 
And Smith was not wrong. Over the last thirty years, hundreds of millions of 
Chinese, Indians, and others have been lifted out of the most dire poverty by 
those nations’ entry into the world economy. That entry was made possible by 
various forms of economic liberalization and technological innovation, such as 
the development of container ships. In East Asia and the Pacific, sixty percent 
of the population lived on less than a dollar a day in 1980; the figure is now 
around ten percent. In South Asia the decline has been from around fifty 
percent to around thirty percent.44 Never in human history has the basic 
material well-being of so many improved by so much so quickly. Of course, it is 
also true that there have been terrible collateral costs. Suicide rates among 
Indian farmers displaced by development have been awful. The environmental 
costs may yet destroy human life on our planet. And there are many other 
downsides. But comfortable middle- and upper-class Americans should not 
forget how much we take for granted in terms of basic material security as a 
consequence of the mass well-being and stable institutions that economic 
wealth have made possible. 
In addition, as I have already said, Hauerwas’s analysis of modern life, as 
with the communitarians, gives too little weight to the fact of diversity with 
respect to our religious beliefs and convictions. It is this, rather than 
 
 41.  Id. at 30.  
 42.  Id. at 33. 
 43.  See generally JOHN BOSWELL, THE KINDNESS OF STRANGERS: THE ABANDONMENT OF 
CHILDREN IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM LATE ANTIQUITY TO THE RENAISSANCE (1988) (discussing 
the prevalence of child abandonment and exposure prior to the rise of modern commercial economies).  
 44.  I’ve taken these figures from the web site of the World Resources Institute. I don’t claim they 
are precise but rather that they are roughly true. See Population Living on Less Than $1 Per Day 1981–
2004, WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE (July 24, 2008), http://www.wri.org/chart/population-living-less-
than-1-per-day-1981-2004. 
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“secularism,” that is the nub of the political problem: the only way to respect 
people as equals in conditions of diversity is to grant them fundamental rights 
and an equal political standing that does not depend upon the correctness of 
their religious convictions. 
While I think that Hauerwas ignores, discounts, or distorts important 
aspects of the liberal political tradition, he certainly is correct that the public, 
moral, and political cultures of modern commercial democracies leave a lot to 
be desired. I return to this below, where I urge that we should learn from 
important aspects of the Hauerwasian project. 
C.   What Liberalism Isn’t 
I am going to turn next to what Hauerwas says about liberalism as a 
philosophical matter in some of the places he discusses it. His criticisms of 
liberalism are often aimed at aspects of our popular culture—excessive 
materialism and consumerism for example—that liberals themselves frequently 
criticize and that stand in the way of realizing liberal ideals of social justice. 
There may be a price to be paid for securing basic liberal rights, democracy, and 
a decent standard of living for all: people have a right to lead lives that are 
excessively consumerist and self-indulgent.45 But liberalism properly conceived 
also seeks to check these tendencies by institutionalizing and promoting the 
values associated with social justice, civic equality, and deliberative democracy. 
Liberals, in fact, will join Hauerwas in seeking ways to curb the excesses of 
materialism and consumerism within the limits of justice, equal rights, and 
democracy. 
In addition, Hauerwas advances a number of broad philosophical 
generalizations about liberal principles and practices that are dubious. 
Following communitarian critics of liberalism, he argues that modern ethics is 
increasingly thin and devoid of substance, and Christian ethicists have erred in 
joining this program.46 The increasing focus on abstract and universal categories, 
and the search for rules and solutions to quandaries on the model of law, he 
argues, has severed ethical reflection from its necessary rootedness in particular 
living traditions, including those of religious communities. Liberal ethics freed 
from its “indebtedness to the past” is often merely procedural with the right 
prior to the good; ethics “as law is often seen as that set of minimum principles 
needed to secure order between people who share little in common[,] . . . [a] 
procedural means to settle disputes and resolve problems while leaving our 
individual ‘preferences’ and desires to our own choice.”47 Many Christian 
theologians, he says, went along with these intellectual trends for the sake of 
 
 45.  It is hardly an original observation that democracy may not always promote the highest and 
noblest moral and cultural ideals. Consider, for example, Book VIII of Plato’s The Republic, as well as 
Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America.  
 46.  Here the influence of communitarian and radical (small “d”) democratic critics of liberalism is 
especially evident. These include MacIntyre, Wolin, Sandel, Taylor, and others. The specific Christian 
dimension is, of course, distinctive. 
 47.  HAUERWAS, supra note 26, at 72. 
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speaking to the wider world of non-believers. In doing so, they only succeeded 
in marginalizing the specifically theological aspects of theological ethics, making 
themselves—as theologians—irrelevant. Ethicists should be far more open to 
the insights of specifically theological ethics, argues Hauerwas, and ethics in 
general should be understood as principally a matter of fostering the virtues.48 
These are practiced in ongoing ethical communities and traditions; little if any 
guidance is furnished by an abstract philosophical ethics that labors over moral 
problems. It is hard to credit some of these claims. Academic ethics is a matter 
of critical inquiry into contending moral theories and practical moral problems. 
It is not primarily didactic. 
So far as political theory is concerned, communitarian critics of liberalism, 
such as MacIntyre and Michael Sandel, have a tendency to ignore or not 
adequately appreciate the practical political problems that liberalism as a 
political program seeks to address. Hauerwas also sometimes identifies the root 
of our problems in excessively formal and philosophical terms, missing the 
moral substance. So we are told that liberalism is excessively procedural, it 
makes the right prior to the good, and ignores the fact that the ethical life must 
be rooted in the practices and ways of communities and expressed in narratives 
and traditions.49 This seems to me quite wrong.50 
In his book, Performing the Faith, Hauerwas makes the strange remark that 
liberals “attempt to form a politics and ethics without memory. Rawls’s ‘original 
position’ has seemed to me the perfect metaphor for the presumption that a 
morally defensible politics is possible without the people who make that politics 
being virtuous.”51 However, the “original position” is a thought experiment 
designed to encourage the better off to put themselves in the shoes of the less 
well off, and to look at the social structure, and consider its acceptability, from 
the standpoint of the relatively poor. It is hard to imagine that Hauerwas would 
object. To the contrary, the concern with the poor that is so evident in Rawls 
seems altogether Christian in spirit. Hauerwas’s criticisms ought to be 
addressed at Milton Friedman or Ronald Reagan, not Rawls. 
The remarks about memory and virtue seem equally misguided. The only 
reason to take seriously the thought experiment of the “original position” is in 
order to take seriously the project of making the social order acceptable to the 
least well off. It requires, at least if one is socially and economically advantaged, 
putting aside self-concern in one’s capacity as a citizen, and taking seriously the 
interests of all of one’s fellow citizens, especially those at the bottom of society. 
 
 48.  See STANLEY HAUERWAS, How “Christian Ethics” Came to Be, in  THE HAUERWAS 
READER, supra note 26, at 37–50; STANLEY HAUERWAS, On Keeping Theological Ethics Theological, 
in THE HAUERWAS READER, supra note 26, at 51–74. 
 49.  HAUERWAS, supra note 34, at 229 (“Liberal social orders do not have the means to 
acknowledge goods in common.”). 
 50.  I argued against these communitarian claims at length in Liberal Virtues. Will Kymlicka 
responded definitively to the point about the right and the good, but unfortunately Sandel seems not to 
have taken notice. See WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE 21–43 (1989).  
 51.  HAUERWAS, supra note 34, at 224–25. 
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The willingness to do this depends upon one having the requisite moral 
motivation, or, if you prefer, virtue. Hauerwas says, more than once, that 
“[l]istening to the weakest member is the kind of church government that is at 
the very heart of the Gospel.”52 Such sentiments suggest a deep if 
unacknowledged kinship with Rawls’ difference principle. Moreover, the only 
way in which social justice can gain a grip on a community is if its basic liberal 
values are embodied in institutions and embraced and deployed by actors at all 
levels of political life, as well as by those extra-political communities such as 
churches that engage in moral and political education. In much of his writing 
Hauerwas seems preoccupied with what he takes to be liberals’ excessive 
philosophical abstraction while missing the moral substance of their claims. 
Hauerwas asserts that “one of the primary intellectual virtues for liberalism 
is cynicism.”53 Hauerwas complains that “such a virtue” is “correlative of the 
demand for autonomy that assumes I must be able to ‘step back’ from my 
engagements. What I ‘do’ is, therefore, not ‘who I am.’”54 This seems to me an 
extremely prejudiced reading of liberalism. Why isn’t it enough to say, with 
respect to autonomy, that what “I do” does not exhaust who I am? For surely 
people can and do step back, question, and revise their values and projects. 
Hauerwas has done a fair amount of that himself, and he has written eloquently 
of the experience. Autonomy requires a particular social context; otherwise, 
there would be nothing to work with. The point about cynicism seems especially 
inapt: Locke, J.S. Mill, and Rawls strike me as three of the least cynical thinkers 
imaginable. 
Michael G. Cartwright summarizes Hauerwas’s critique of liberalism in his 
“Reader’s Guide” at the end of the very useful Hauerwas Reader. This brief 
summary, consistent with what I have read in Hauerwas, highlights what I take 
to be the core problems of Hauerwas’s views on liberalism. It names liberalism 
as the “regnant political theory” of contemporary America. It notes that 
Hauerwas has acknowledged that liberalism has “many faces” and much 
ambiguity, but these evidently permit a good deal of generalization. Thanks to 
liberalism Americans assume that “unlike other societies, we are not creatures 
of history, but that we have the possibility of a new beginning. We are thus able 
to form our government on the basis of principle rather than the arbitrary 
elements of tradition.”55 This is hard to figure out. The revolution and the 
founding of the constitutional order were a new beginning in politics, though 
also deeply indebted to the past and inconceivable without the ideas, habits, 
and institutions that Americans inherited. It is true that Americans have been 
talking for a long time about having the “power to begin the world over 
 
 52.  HAUERWAS, supra note 29, at 527. 
 53.  HAUERWAS, supra note 24, at 224–5. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Michael G. Cartwright, Stanley Hauerwas’s Essays in Theological Ethics: A Reader’s Guide,  in 
THE HAUERWAS READER, supra note 26, at 623, 635 (internal quotations omitted). 
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again.”56 Reagan paraphrased that remark of Paine’s to good rhetorical effect, 
but it would be wrong to take what may be hyperbole for a general 
philosophical commitment of liberalism. In any event, no political people 
invoke their “founding fathers” more than Americans. The constitutional 
tradition has enormous legitimacy in America—too much actually—but that 
belies the notion that our politics is ahistorical. Finally, the contrast between 
“principle” and “tradition” seems to me confused: moral principles are needed 
to do the work of separating the wheat of our tradition from the chaff of our 
history.57 
According to Hauerwas, liberalism is mythological and ideological; it hides 
and diffuses its power in a comforting myth, and thereby effectively tyrannizes 
its subjects.58 The liberal myth is that 
a people do not need a shared history; all they need is a system of rules that will 
constitute procedures for resolving disputes as they pursue their various interests. 
Thus liberalism is a political philosophy committed to the proposition that a social 
order and corresponding mode of government can be formed on self-interest and 
consent.
59
 
This is a caricature: few liberals base their theories on “self-interest.” 
In spite of his hostility to liberal political philosophy, as he understands it, 
Hauerwas frequently says things that most liberals would fully accept: 
[P]olitics depends upon tradition, for politics is nothing else but a community’s 
internal conversation with itself concerning the various possibilities of understanding 
and extending its life. In fact, the very discussion necessary to maintain the tradition 
can be considered an end in itself, since it provides the means for the community to 
discover the good it holds in common.
60
 
Authority and tradition for Hauerwas seem to involve shared judgments 
formed through conversation; the conversation is ongoing, and through it new 
members are inducted into the ongoing conversation. “Conversation” suggests 
unforced and open exchange, on the merits. This all seems exactly right to me, 
and Hauerwas seems also to recognize that freedom is a “necessary condition 
for a community to come to a more truthful understanding of itself and the 
world.”61 The church serves this freedom by being a “contrast model” for 
secular politics.62 This all seems to me quite congruent with liberalism and 
liberal public reason. 
* * * 
Liberalism was born in response to the problem of religious diversity, and in 
efforts to establish toleration and, eventually, equal freedom for all. Liberal 
 
 56.  THOMAS PAINE, Common Sense, in COLLECTED WRITINGS 52 (Eric Foner ed., 1995). 
 57.  PELIKAN, supra note 23, at 76–77.   
 58.  HAUERWAS, supra note 29, at 636. 
      59.   HAUERWAS, supra note 26, at 78.  
 60.  From Michael Cartwright’s concluding overview of Hauerwas’s work. Cartwright, supra note 
55, at 637–38 (quoting Stanley Hauerwas). 
 61.  HAUERWAS, supra note 5, at 62. 
 62.  Id. at 84. 
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constitutional democracy seeks to insure that everyone enjoys the protections 
of due process of law; that governments are accountable to the people 
collectively; and that political power serves the common good, which requires 
paying special attention to the least well off. Philosophers seek to connect such 
institutions, practices, and commitments with more abstract philosophical 
principles, often in order to improve the system’s principled consistency. We 
should try not to forget, however, that liberalism is first and foremost a political 
program: its principles are meant to inform institutional design, the welfare 
state, and democratic practices. The connection between liberal political 
arrangements and very abstract philosophical commitments is often contentious 
and may be quite tenuous. 
D.   Core, Periphery, and Popular Culture 
I have suggested in effect that Hauerwas’s principal complaints focus on 
matters outside the liberal core: on commercial values and popular culture, 
sexual permissiveness, high rates of abortion, and mass patriotic violence. I 
have sympathy with these concerns. So what are we to do politically? The 
question is: Should we work to address these problems within the bounds set by 
equal rights and democratic institutions, or do they require overriding these 
liberal democratic guarantees? 
Although Hauerwas is neither a conservative nor a neoconservative, 
Hauerwas echoes their charge that liberalism undermines the sources of the 
virtues on which it depends.63 It is true that that liberalism undermines older 
virtues that are at odds with or in tension with liberalism. The traditional 
patriarchal family and its characteristic “virtues” are undermined by gender 
equality. Gender equality is at the root of very many of the changes in family 
relations that are associated with the 1960s. Women demanded control of their 
reproductive lives and that required access to contraception and abortion. 
Women’s entry into the workplace and the availability of social welfare services 
for single mothers made divorce a much more plausible option for many 
women. Hauerwas expresses sympathy with radical feminism, so he may also 
need to concede that some forms of profound social progress may bring with 
them what some view as unintended social costs, such as a decline in lifelong 
marital commitment. 
Now, of course, there are many ways—consistent with fundamental liberal 
democratic commitments to equal rights and opportunities—to address 
problems associated with family fragility. Much more generous social services 
and publicly funded child care, as in Europe, can lessen the costs to children of 
family breakup. And of course, better sex education and easier access to 
contraceptives could lower the abortion rate. Liberals do not stand in the way 
of such changes; they endorse them. Classical or free market liberalism, what 
we call conservatism in America, is often the problem here. 
 
 63.  HAUERWAS, supra note 24, at 226. 
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We might, therefore, consider the range of policy responses to various social 
pathologies concerning the family and childrearing and other matters that are 
consistent with equal rights. There is much we could do. It is difficult to know 
whether or to what extent genuine liberal commitments to equal liberty stand in 
the way of attractive policy responses until we hear some proposals. Vague 
abstractions about the perceived social costs of certain liberal commitments do 
not have much traction here. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
The practice of liberal public reason, properly understood, is part of the best 
understanding of the virtues of democratic citizenship in a diverse society. 
Nevertheless, if Hauerwas-inspired preachers can motivate Christian citizens to 
oppose unjust wars, to press for greater opportunity for the poor and racial 
minorities, and generally to work on behalf of a more just or more decent 
society, more power to them! It is generally far more important to get people to 
do the right thing than to get them to appreciate the appropriate reasons for 
doing so. 
Public reason opens the possibility—obviously still distant—that citizens 
who disagree about religion and much else can nevertheless reassure one 
another that their politics is based on sound moral reasons held in common. 
Public reason as a democratic ideal requires judgment, flexibility, and a 
pragmatic openness to alternative argumentative strategies. Public reason must 
also be a two-way street, open to challenge by arguments from particular 
communities and groups, including religious communities. Liberal democratic 
public reason fails on its own terms if it silences critical voices or squelches the 
justice-promoting moral energies of religious and ethical communities. 
The virtues of civil deliberation are only a subset of the virtues of 
democratic citizens, and a rigid insistence on public reason may impede the 
pursuit of justice.64 Sometimes other virtues are more important: moral 
seriousness, the courage and determination to actually confront injustice when 
the personal costs may be high, sympathy with the downtrodden, a willingness 
to work with others toward a more just society, and the capacity to articulate 
and entertain unpopular positions. Hauerwas’s writings frequently exhibit such 
virtues in abundance. 
 
 
 64.  Perhaps this is what many critics of Rawls have in mind. See, e.g., PAUL WEITHMAN, 
RELIGION AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 13–35 (2002) (a sometime critic and—more 
recently—a defender of Rawls). 
